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Book Review: Defending the Realm? The Politics of Britain’s
Small Wars Since 1945
Britain is often revered for its extensive experience of waging ‘small wars’. Its long imperial history is littered
with high profile counter-insurgency campaigns, thus marking it out as the world’s most seasoned practitioner
of this type of warfare. In Defending the Realm? Aaron Edwards details the tactical and operational
dynamics of Britain’s small wars, arguing that the military’s use of force was more heavily constrained by wider
strategic and political considerations than previously admitted. Andrew Holt finds a concise, readable text that
should be of interest to students and scholars of British foreign policy, international relations, and security
studies.
Defending the Realm? The Polit ics of Britain’s Small Wars Since
1945. Aaron Edwards. Manchester University Press. December 2012.
Find this book: 
In March 2003, Brit ish f orces joined a US-led coalit ion in invading Iraq.
Within a month President Saddam Hussein had been toppled. However, it
was not until 2009 that Brit ish combat troops pulled out of  the country,
with the situation f ollowing the pattern of  many other ‘small wars’. These
conf licts, typically clandestine in nature and f ought against non-state
actors, “have been an integral part of  Brit ish military experience f or
hundreds of  years” (p. 2). They were particularly prominent f or the United
Kingdom in the af termath of  World War II as decolonisation progressed.
Thus, as we mark the tenth anniversary of  the beginning of  the Iraq War,
and with Brit ish troops f inally on the verge of  withdrawal f rom
Af ghanistan f ollowing the conf lict that began in October 2001, now is an
opportune moment to examine the contemporary historical record of
Britain’s small wars.
In his new book, Aaron Edwards f ocuses on the strategic dimension of  these conf licts, paying
particular attention to relations between civilian and military leaders. The f irst f ive chapters
consider colonial operations in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden respectively. Malaya is of
particular interest. This campaign has of ten been highlighted as an example of  how to successf ully f ight an
asymmetrical war, yet it was f ar f rom an unmitigated success. Indeed, Edwards shows how “f ailure was only
narrowly averted” thanks to the actions of  the colonial government’s reorganisation of  civil and military
leadership (pp. 61–62). In contrast, “in terms of  civil-military relations, Aden was an unmitigated f ailure” (p.
179) with Lt Col Colin Mitchell (‘Mad Mitch’) at the centre of  events af ter leading the reoccupation of  Crater
in July 1967.
Closer to home, Edwards demonstrates how, despite its “intellectual reservoir of  colonial experience”, “the
Army was woef ully unprepared f or operations in Northern Ireland” (p. 193). This chapter is particularly
comprehensive, no doubt benef it ing f rom the author ’s earlier research on Ulster. Taking place on home soil,
the troubles represent a very dif f erent small war. There was the added complication of  coordinating with
the police, which was eased by 1977 by the ult imate emergence of  police primacy. Managing the gap
between London’s strategic lead and tactics on the ground also proved dif f icult, with ‘Mad Mitch’ warned of
just this in the House of  Commons af ter his election in 1970.
The f inal two chapters are somewhat dif f erent. The operations in Iraq and Af ghanistan are too recent f or
the f ull range of  archival sources to be available, though the author does make use of  the material
declassif ied as part of  the Chilcot Inquiry. Both missions were also notable in the sense that Britain was
part of  a coalit ion, and eventually also had to liaise with a host nation. The chapter on Af ghanistan would
benef it f rom being f rom being a litt le longer, though it does highlight issues of  polit ical interf erence. On
Iraq, Edwards is at t imes particularly damning, arguing that “Despite the dedication and prof essionalism of
the armed f orces in implementing government policy, the polit icians f ailed the soldiers” (p. 252). Planning
was rushed and hidden, with the Chief  of  the Def ence Staf f  even prevented by the Def ence Secretary f rom
liaising with the Chief  of  Def ence Logistics f or f ear that, if  leaked, knowledge of  such a meeting could
damage the negotiations taking place at the UN.
Each case study engages the relevant literature and shows how lessons f rom earlier missions were applied
– or not, as the case may be. Indeed, “it is the tendency to identif y the wrong lessons that has of ten spelt
disaster f or Britain” (p. 267). Knowledge gained f rom Northern Ireland was misapplied in Iraq; the reasons
f or success in Malaya and elsewhere not suitably considered in Af ghanistan. The importance of  intelligence
is another common theme, and is highlighted and elucidated very well. Again, lessons were sometimes learnt
slowly. Structural problems of  intelligence were identif ied in Aden despite its importance in Malaya, while
intelligence f ailures were also partly responsible f or the events of  Bloody Sunday.
The book provides an excellent overview of  a number of  signif icant case studies, showing how “The init ial
absence of  an overarching end goal has been the signature piece of  most of  Britain’s ‘small wars’” (p. 247).
It is well- inf ormed by the literature of  strategic studies, but also handles an array of  historical source
material expertly. Government documents and the collections of  private papers are supplemented by
interviews with soldiers who saw active service. While acknowledging Brit ish successes where appropriate it
concludes that “Britain has typically misapplied f orce against its irregular opponents in the short term,
bef ore, f inally, re-calibrating its approach f or success in the long term” (p. 288). The book is concise,
readable and should be of  interest to students and scholars of  Brit ish f oreign policy, international relations
and security studies.
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